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The risk of climate change must not be forgotten in the context of the current health crisis<\/a>. This systemic risk has, as everyone knows, already led to a major revision of the global industrial agenda, in the form of the energy transition<\/a><\/span>1<\/sup><\/a><\/span>. Our thesis is that a re-examination of the dominant strategic model generally put forward to achieve this objective is now justified. In order to establish this proposal, we need to :<\/p>\n For readers in a hurry: start with the third part, because the first two parts contain information that many readers already know: they are there to explain the background of the reasoning.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n By strategic model, we mean the representation of risk and the levers to control it<\/span>2<\/sup><\/a><\/span>. A change in model means a change in our representation of risk and\/or a change in the identified levers of action.<\/p>\n In the case at hand, we are not discussing how we represent risk, but only proposing a new lever of action. But to do so, we must first recall the existing levers of action.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Within the energy transition, the main lever of action to control the risk of climate change is that of green technological substitutes that make it possible to reduce the level of greenhouse gas emissions while maintaining or increasing the level of industrial activity. The reduction of activity and the adoption of new consumption and lifestyle behaviours complete this lever.<\/p>\n Among the alternative green technologies, we find :<\/p>\n <\/p>\n These alternative green technologies face a number of problems, some of which are still under development. For example, the electric vehicle does not yet inspire full confidence among the mass of consumers. But on the whole, their problem is not one of technological competitiveness. The main problem is that most of these technologies are not economically competitive with carbon-based technologies.<\/strong><\/p>\n The current very low level of the petrol price<\/span>3<\/sup><\/a><\/span>\u00a0leads us to consider that this major problem will not disappear on its own quickly.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n The approach of governments and international organizations makes extensive use of the concept of economic externality. An externality is the positive or negative change in the utility of an economic agent caused by the choices of another agent. For example, pollution of a river caused by a pharmaceutical factory affects the use of the river by other actors. This is a case of a negative externality. Global warming is similarly understood within the dominant model of energy transition as a negative externality.<\/p>\n In essence, externalities escape systemic regulation by the existing market. However, public authorities can internalise these factors by establishing new rules to encourage or discourage the behaviour that causes the externalities. In this way, they artificially create a new market<\/span>4<\/sup><\/a><\/span>. In our example, a new regulation may lead the plant to reduce the use of certain polluting substances or face material penalties. In order to make this regulation work, the authorities regularly take measures to analyse the quality of the river water, or even directly analyse the content of the factory’s waste.<\/p>\n As part of the fight against global warming through the energy transition, we thus find an arsenal of devices aimed primarily at measuring the level of emissions associated with all human activities. A carbon market<\/span>5<\/sup><\/a><\/span> is then set up for industrial activities, aiming to give a material advantage to players who reduce their emissions, or who emit little greenhouse gas. The advantage takes the form of a right to pollute, whose value depends on the market price of carbon.<\/p>\n Some measures are sector-specific. The oil sector is subject to significant taxes on its main product. The automobile sector must apply standards limiting the level of vehicle emissions, under penalty of material sanctions. It also benefits from targeted incentives, such as subsidies for the purchase of electric vehicles. The energy sector is also subject to measures to promote the development of renewable energies<\/span>6<\/sup><\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n The main shortcoming of the dominant policy model is that in the face of the lack of competitiveness of green technologies, its toolbox is limited to policy solutions. In the automotive sector, it is no exaggeration to say that the stringency of new standards is such that it is in fact politics that takes direct control of the technological choices of industrial actors<\/span>7<\/sup><\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\n The justification for this control is based on the idea that the market would not be able to anticipate or integrate certain problems. Far be it from us to categorically reject this justification. It is quite clear that in some cases, the decision-making horizon of private players is not sufficient to make the investments necessary for the development of breakthrough technologies. State control of industrial affairs can be a form of productive socialism<\/em>.<\/p>\n The energy transition agenda since at least the Brundtland report is also basically based on a socialist approach to economic problems. Is this socialism, however, a productive socialism?<\/p>\n By the way, I am actually a socialist. Just not the kind that shifts resources from most productive to least productive, pretending to do good, while actually causing harm. True socialism seeks greatest good for all.<\/p>\n — Elon Musk (@elonmusk) June 16, 2018<\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n
1. The dominant strategic model of energy transition<\/h2>\n
1.1. The levers of action already known<\/h3>\n
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1.2. Problems related to existing technological substitutes<\/h3>\n
1.3. The toolbox of the dominant model in the face of these problems<\/h3>\n
2. Critical analysis of the dominant strategic model<\/h2>\n
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